To attend or not to attend? China's Victory Day invitation becomes diplomatic tightrope for Lee.

Chinese military vehicles carrying DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles, potentially capable of sinking a U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in a single strike, drive past Tiananmen Gate during a military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2015. [AP/YONHAP]

 
As South Korean President Lee Jae Myung weighs his decision over an invitation to attend China's Victory Day military parade in Beijing on Sept. 3, what might appear to be a symbolic gesture could carry significant geopolitical weight far beyond the viewing platform in Tiananmen Square.
 
The parade, which commemorates China’s victory over imperial Japan in World War II, was last held in 2015. At the time, then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye was the only leader from a liberal democracy to attend, marking a rare moment of diplomatic outreach toward Beijing.
 
Now, nearly a decade later, Lee faces a similar crossroads. At a press conference Thursday, he reaffirmed South Korea’s “steadfast” alliance with the United States and its ongoing cooperation with both Washington and Tokyo. At the same time, he emphasized a desire to “improve” ties with China and Russia — both countries that maintain close relations with a nuclear-armed North Korea.
 

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Attending the parade could open the door for a bilateral meeting between Lee and Chinese President Xi Jinping, potentially offering a platform for Seoul to recalibrate its relationship with Beijing.
 
Lee’s decision may be seen not as a ceremonial choice, but a deliberate signal — one that could shape perceptions of South Korea’s foreign policy direction at a time of intensifying competition between the United States and China.
 
A taming act?
 
While Lee has only recently begun touting his foreign policy as “pragmatic diplomacy,” emphasizing the need for South Korea to prioritize its national interests over picking a side between the world’s major powers, his advocacy for better balance in Seoul’s ties with Washington and Beijing goes back several years.
 

Korean President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a town hall in Daejeon on July 4. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

 
“We aim to make both the U.S. and China choose to cooperate with us,” he declared in August 2021 in the lead-up to the 2022 presidential election, which he lost to his predecessor, former President Yoon Suk Yeol.
 
However, experts worry that the Chinese invitation for Lee to attend the upcoming parade in Beijing is intended to underscore historically rooted grievances held by South Korea and China regarding Japan’s wartime atrocities and roll back growing security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo.
 
“China is trying to exploit potential fissures in South Korea–United States–Japan trilateral cooperation,” said Joo Jae-woo, a professor of international politics at Kyung Hee University. “The invitation is an attempt to tame South Korea’s role in this triangle.”
 
In Washington, the optics of Lee standing alongside Xi at a military ceremony may raise questions about Seoul’s strategic commitments.
 
The White House reportedly expressed disapproval when Park attended the 2015 parade.
 
In an online report published last month, Atlantic Council senior fellow Shawn Creamer wrote Lee “will find trouble with the U.S. relationship if he seeks to deepen South Korea’s relations with China or is overly antagonistic to Japan, the other major U.S. ally in East Asia.”
 
A diplomatic opening with Beijing?
 
As Lee’s administration has emphasized economic recovery and better relations with all of Seoul’s neighbors in its policy agenda, his attendance could also carry benefits.
 
China remains one of South Korea’s largest trading partners, and better ties with Beijing could aid Seoul’s quest to reinvigorate its domestic economy and rein in Pyongyang’s illicit weapons programs.
 

Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the Central Asia-China summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on June 17. [KAZAKHSTAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE]

 
In his first phone call with Xi upon his election last month, Lee urged Xi to play a “constructive role” in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and expressed hope that the pair might engage in “closer exchanges of views to advance bilateral relations” between Seoul and Beijing.
 
In a 2015 report for the Lowy Institute, Robert Kelly, a political science professor at Pusan National University, suggested that then-President Park’s decision to attend the parade was likely driven by a strategic calculation: the hope of securing Beijing’s cooperation on Pyongyang. “Swaying China on North Korea is so important that a bit of instrumental flattery is worth it,” he wrote.
 
However, it should be noted that Park’s attendance failed to boost South Korea-China relations in the long term.
 
Beijing banned Chinese group tours from traveling to South Korea the following year, when the Park administration decided to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, antimissile system. It also targeted South Korean business operations in China with increased safety inspections and other restrictions.
 

Chinese President Xi Jinping, center, and invited dignitaries arrive on the balcony of Tiananmen Gate in Beijing to watch a parade marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II on Sept. 3, 2015. Russian President Vladimir Putin is on the left, while then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye is on the right. [XINHUA/YONHAP]

 
Given lingering trade tensions, travel restrictions and competition in high-tech sectors, Lee’s attendance at the parade could prove an opening to improve relations — or at least prevent further deterioration.
 
Declining the invitation, however, would not necessarily constitute a diplomatic slight. On the contrary, some argue that abstention would strengthen Seoul’s credibility with Washington and clarify its strategic posture.
 
“Skipping this year’s parade could send a message that South Korea will not play into symbolic optics that jeopardize its security alignment,” said Joo.
 
Many risks, little reward
 
The current geopolitical climate differs markedly from a decade ago. The Biden and Trump administrations have both emphasized countering Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific.  
 
At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last month, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that “Beijing is credibly preparing to potentially use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific” and that the Pentagon is “reorienting toward deterring aggression by communist China.”
 
In recent comments, U.S. military planners, such as United States Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson, have suggested they see South Korea as a “fixed aircraft carrier” that could help the U.S. military overcome the “tyranny of distance” in the vast Indo-Pacific region.
 
According to Brunson, Washington is pursuing “strategic flexibility” that would allow it to deploy American forces outside the peninsula.
 
The general added that USFK is focused not only on “defeating” North Korea, but also on operations, activities and investments “as a small part of the greater Indo-Pacific strategy.”
 
It remains unclear how Lee would respond to this reorientation of U.S. forces on the peninsula to counter China instead of just deterring North Korea. 
 
The presidential office said Wednesday that it is in communication with Beijing regarding its invitation to Lee, but declined to disclose more details, citing the sensitivity of diplomatic exchanges.
 
However, if Lee accepts the invitation to Beijing’s parade, Washington may interpret his attendance as a signal that Seoul is out of alignment with the U.S. strategy to contain China in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
 
“Resisting strategic flexibility will likely be interpreted by U.S. military planners as being not only as out of step with the administration’s policies, but also seen by Trump as ‘free-riding’ by the Korean ally, which might cause him to take vindictive actions to express his displeasure,” wrote Victor Cha of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank. “This could even include pulling all troops out of South Korea.”
 

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]